EDWARDS: Civil Liberties implications of the plutonium

[Oscar]

Civil Liberties implications of the plutonium society (often called the plutonium economy)
From: Gordon Edwards
Sent: Saturday, March 6, 2021 1:49 AM

Here are some documents from authoritative sources touching on the relation between plutonium and civil liberties.

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1. Excerpt from. http://www.ccnr.org/Peaceful_Atom.html

Several of the top scientists involved in the US Nuclear Weapons program discuss their concerns.

Dr. Theodore Taylor, Nuclear Weapons designer, reads a statement by Dr. Bernard Feld, Assistant Leader of the Critical Assembly Group, WW II Atom Bomb Project

"Let me tell you about a nightmare I have. The mayor of Boston sends for me for an urgent consultation. He has received a note from a terrorist group, telling him that they have planted a nuclear bomb somewhere in central Boston. The mayor has confirmed that twenty pounds of plutonium is missing from Government stocks. He shows me the crude diagram and a set of the terrorists' outrageous demands. The diagram is familiar -- it is similar to one I saw about a year ago drawn up for fun by a student at M.I.T. [Massachusetts Institute of Technology]. I know -- as one of those who participated in the assembly of the first atomic bomb -- that the device would work. Not efficiently, but nevertheless with devastating effect. What should I advise? Surrender to blackmail or risk destroying my home town? I would have to advise surrender.

"Let me explain the background to that nightmare. Plutonium is the stuff out of which atomic bombs are made. And the amount of plutonium in the world is increasing year by year as nuclear power spreads. Within the next ten years nuclear power plants will be producing around 100 tons of plutonium a year -- enough for 10,000 atomic bombs, each with the same power as the one that destroyed Nagasaki. It is hard to believe that a figure as big and as threatening as this is realistic -- but I assure you that this is what is being planned.

"So within the next ten years, there will be hundreds of tons of plutonium wandering around the world. It will be as easy as pie for a determined group to get hold of the 20 or so pounds needed for a Nagasaki-type bomb. And making a crude version of one of these bombs, once you've got the plutonium, is not all that difficult. Even a crudely-made bomb, much less efficient than the Nagasaki bomb, would be powerful enough to level whole areas of a city and to cause thousands or tens of thousands of immediate fatalities, not to speak of the further thousands condemned to slower death by lung or bone cancer from plutonium inhalation.

"This terrifying possibility will become an inevitability if the major industrialized nations persist in their current grossly irresponsible policies. Nuclear reactors, plutonium reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities and the technologies needed to operate them are today being sold to any country with enough cash or oil to buy them. This irresponsible behaviour is not confined to any one country. The United States and France are supplying South Korea and Iran with nuclear facilities; West Germany has made a deal with Brazil; Canadian help unwittingly made possible India's nuclear explosion; Britain's Windscale facilities will be used to process Japanese wastes for their plutonium content; India is now cooperating with Argentina; and the Soviet Union is spreading nuclear reactors and technology through the Communist world. This list can be continued ad horrendum.

"The problem cannot be solved by the individual action of any one nation. If there is any solution at all it can only come about from the concerted action of all the industrialized nations. But little can be done if these nations continue to treat the problem as if it either does not exist or will somehow go away.

"Today the world stands at a crossroads. Will the needed steps be taken to avert the world-wide proliferation of nuclear bomb materials, or will it be another example of too little, too late?"

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2. Excerpts from the Flowers Report. http://www.ccnr.org/Flowers_plute.html

Sir Brian Flowers, an eminent British Nuclear Physicist, wrote the report entitled “Nuclear Energy and the Environment” for the UK Royal Commission on the Environment

The problem of safeguarding society . . . could become formidable in a "plutonium economy". There are particular risks during transport of the element between nuclear installations, although techniques could be adopted to make access to the plutonium both dangerous and difficult. There is also, however, the risk of theft of plutonium by direct action at installations where it is stored, or by people working in the industry. Of course, many measures are taken to prevent this but it cannot be entirely ruled out. In order to counteract these risks, some people foresee the need for the creation of special security organizations which, because of the vast potential consequences of plutonium loss, would need to exercise unprecedented thoroughness and vigilance to safeguard the material....

A belief that the necessary vigilance and continuity could not be adequately guaranteed in any normal organization led Alvin Weinberg [ed. note: an eminent nuclear physicist at the US Oak Ridge Nuclear Laboratory] to postulate a "nuclear priesthood"; this would be a dedicated, self-perpetuating body of people forming a technological élite which would be entrusted through the generations with the task of safeguarding society from the hazards of nuclear power. The idea of such a "priesthood" may seem untenable, but it is an indication of the extent of the anxiety felt by some responsible people about the hazards. Concern about security also led Weinberg to suggest that "nuclear parks" should be established. By this is meant the siting of reactors and related fuel fabrication and processing facilities in a large, self-contained nuclear complex in order to facilitate security arrangements, particularly by eliminating the need to transport plutonium.

Many people are concerned about the implications for society of the security arrangements that might become necessary in a plutonium economy. An effective security organization could not be merely passive, simply reacting to events. It would need to have an active role ... ; that is, to infiltrate potentially dangerous organizations, monitor the activities of nuclear employees and members of the public and, generally, carry out clandestine operations. It would also have to have powers of search and powers to clear whole areas in an emergency. Such operations might have to be conducted on a scale greatly exceeding what would otherwise be required on grounds of national security in democratic countries. The fear is expressed that adequate security against nuclear threats will be obtained only at the price of gradual but inexorable infringements of personal freedom.

The security measures that might become necessary to protect society could seriously affect personal liberties. The need for such measures would be affected by increasing tensions between nations. Indeed, the future risks posed by plutonium constitute a world problem that would not be solved by unilateral action.... We emphasize again that our concern here is not with the position at present, or even in the next decade, but with what it might become within the next fifty years. In speculating on developments on such a time scale, no one has a prerogative of vision. It appears to us, however, that the dangers of the creation of plutonium in large quantities in conditions of increasing world unrest are genuine and serious. [para. 506]

For this reason we think it remarkable that none of the official documents we have seen during our study convey any unease on this score. The management and safeguarding of plutonium are regarded as just another problem arising from nuclear development, and as one which can certainly be solved given suitable control arrangements. Nowhere is there any suggestion of apprehension about the possible long-term dangers to the fabric and freedom of our society. [para. 507]

We are sufficiently persuaded by the dangers of a plutonium economy that we regard this as a central issue in the debate over the future of nuclear power. We believe that we should not rely for something as basic as energy on a process that produces such a hazardous substance as plutonium unless we are convinced there is no reasonably certain economic alternative.
It may well be said that our concern on these point is premature; that there is, after all, no firm commitment to nuclear production on the scale indicated ... and that other energy sources are already being actively examined. We should not be satisfied with this response. The important thing is the attitude towards alternative approaches and the resources devoted to assessing their potential and promoting their development. The basic belief of the Department of Energy ... is that nuclear fission using the fast breeder reactor [fueled with plutonium] is the only real option for meeting our future energy needs. We fear that on this premise, there may be a gradual, step by step progression to over-riding dependence on nuclear power through tacit acceptance of its inevitability, and a gradual foreclosing of other options that might have been available had they been exercised in time. We recommend that it should be the aim of policy to lessen our dependence on fission power to the extent that this would command public acceptance in the light of a full understanding of the implications and of the issues involved. [para. 512]

We have explained our reasons for thinking that nuclear development raises long-term issues of unusual range and difficulty which are political and ethical, as well as technical, in character. We regard the future implications of a plutonium economy as so serious that we should not wish to become committed to this course unless it is clear that the issues have been fully appreciated and weighed; in view of their nature we believe this can be assured only in the light of wide public understanding. We are perfectly clear that there has been so far very little official consideration of these matters. The view that was expressed by the Department of Energy in their evidence to us was that there were reasonable prospects that the safety and environmental problems posed by nuclear power could be satisfactorily overcome and that, if this proved not to be so, other forms of energy would have to be used, or consumption somehow curtailed. We see this as a policy that could lead to recognition of the dangers when it would be too late to avoid them. More is needed here than bland, unsubstantiated official assurance that the environmental impact of nuclear power has been fully taken into account. [para. 521]

We have concluded that a special procedure is needed.... A comprehensive document setting out the issues and the evidence should be published first in draft. We envisage that much of the evidence would be prepared by the proponents of nuclear development ... but plainly other contributions would be required. The statement must not be confined to the effects of the first stage of development, but must follow through to the furthest point to which our current knowledge can attain. The social and economic, as well as the scientific, technological and environmental problems must be fully set out.[para. 523]

This publication should be followed by a further stage in which the comments made by interested agencies and individuals should be presented and evaluated. These presentations should ultimately receive independent assessment.... No doubt the introduction of such a procedure would present many difficulties which we have been unable to examine closely, but we are convinced about the need for it. The ultimate aim is clear: it is to enable decisions on major questions of nuclear development to take place by explicit political process. [para. 524]
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3. Excerpts from “Policing Plutonium: The Civil Liberties Fallout” http://www.ccnr.org/harvard_on_mox.html

Harvard Civil Liberties and Civil Rights Law Review

To the extent that traditional doctrinal guarantees of privacy are swept away in the face of a plutonium threat, the decision whether to accept the risks and burdens of plutonium recycling ought to take into account, in advance, the strains which it will place on the fourth amendment.

Little in the way of judicial supervision of police conduct in searching for plutonium appears to be in prospect; [263] in particular it does not appear that widespread area search programs would either be declared unlawful [264] or enjoined. [265]

Although broad, highly offensive searches for stolen plutonium would be constitutionally "justified" in the sense that courts would probably uphold them, there would nonetheless be a sense that important constitutional interests had been sacrificed. By examining alternative characterizations of the fourth amendment which seek to legitimate searches for plutonium, one can conclude that the amendment itself commands a forward-looking review of the effects of plutonium recycling on individual privacy.

One such alternative would rely on a theory of consent suggested in part by United States v. Biswell. [266] There the Court held that a warrantless search of a locked storeroom of a firearms dealer as authorized by the Gun Control Act of 1968, [267] did not violate the fourth amendment. The Court found that the invasion of the dealer's privacy was justified since "[w]hen a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection." [268]

The use of the term "chooses" suggests that the dealer's decision to enter the firearms business functions as a substitute for the magistrate's decision to authorize the search of his premises. In a sense, he assumes the risk of being searched; because he contributes to an increased level of general risk in society, it is deemed fair to impose this burden on him. [269]

Use of this theory to justify area searches for plutonium would quickly dissolve into question-begging, however.

The argument would have to be that society, by engaging in plutonium recycling and thereby raising the general level of danger, has accepted any losses of privacy which might become necessary in order to minimize the risk. But warrantless searches and area searches with or without warrants are indiscriminate: one would be faced with the problem of deciding whether the persons who objected to them had or had not constructively assented to the inconvenience.

The only way to break out of the circle would be to insist that the decision to tolerate the police practices required for the recovery of plutonium be a unanimous one by all of the people.